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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

GAETANO A. DONATELLI and LAURA
DONATELLI,
Appellate Case No. 20080020
District Court Civil No. 050102304

Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
TROY BEAUMONT and PENHALL
COMPANY, a California corporation,
Defendants/Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action is within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the
Court of Appeals by the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue,

Was the district court correct in ruling that Gaetano A. DonatelH

("DonatelH") waived any entitlement to prejudgment interest on the amount awarded to
him by the jury in this matter? Did DonatelH create the condition of which he now
complains?

1

Standard of Review. The appropriateness of a trial court's decision not to award
prejudgment interest is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lefavi v.
Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, % 23, 994 P.2d 817.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44,
authorized.

Personal injury judgments—Interest

(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any
other person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by
negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or
partnership, and whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise,
the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on the special damages
actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to
the cause of action.
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in section 15-1-1, from the
date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the
date of entering the judgment, and to include in that judgment.
(3)
As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss
of future earning capacity.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. On May 10, 2001, Troy Beaumont, while driving a Penhall
Company truck on his way home from work, rear-ended a vehicle driven by Gaetano
DonatelH, a Wyoming resident, on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the time
of the accident, DonatelH had been following another vehicle driven by a family
member. A third vehicle suddenly pulled out in front of the family member and took off,
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causing the family member and Donatelli to both slam on their brakes. Beaumont did .
not have enough time to stop and bumped Donatelli's vehicle at a speed of 4-5 miles per
hour. The Donatelli vehicle sustained approximately $1,700 worth of minor damage.
The truck sustained no damage. Donatelli complained of back pain and was transported
to Jordan Valley Hospital where he was examined, treated with pain medication, and
released the same day.
After almost four years, Donatelli sued Beaumont and Beaumont's employer,
Penhall Company, for injuries sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident.
Defendants challenged Donatelli's claimed damages. Donatelli's medical records reflect
that he had preexisting back problems for which he had received "repeated treatment."
Over the next few years after the accident, Donatelli received continued to receive
medical treatment for back problems. The evidence presented to the jury included
evidence from Donatelli's own medical provider, Dr. Shramek, that he had determined
that any back injury resulting from the accident had resolved within a few weeks.
Stephen Marble, M.D., Appellees' expert witness who conducted an IME of Donatelli
and reviewed his medical records prior to and after the accident, confirmed this
determination. In fact, Donatelli did not seek treatment for back pain from June, 2001
until November, 2001. Substantial evidence was presented to the jury, which supported
the position that the subsequent back pain was related to his ongoing degenerative disk
disease and not related to the motor vehicle accident in the form of expert testimony and
the testimony of Donatelli's treating physician.
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A jury trial was held in April 2007. At the end of trial, Donatelli's counsel
proposed, and the court accepted, a special verdict form which included question 7:
What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano Donatelli for the
damages he has suffered as a result of the collision as addressed in these instructions? A
copy of the Interrogatories to Jury and Verdict Form is attached herein as Addendum #1.
The jury returned a verdict for Donatelli, which included an amount to compensate
Gaetano Donatelli for the damages he suffered in the amount of $137,543.48. The jury
came back into the courtroom with a proposed "special verdict" three times. Each time
the proposed verdict was reviewed by counsel for the parties and each time the jury was
polled with counsel for Donatelli never objecting to the special verdict or the form of the
question.
Course of Proceedings, After the trial was over and the jury was dismissed,
Donatelli filed a Motion and Application for Prejudgment Interests and Costs on May 4,
2007. Appellees filed a Memorandum in Opposition on May 18, 2007, objecting to the
prejudgment interest on the ground that the verdict form, which counsel for Donatelli had
created submitted and requested, did not distinguish between special and general
damages and therefore, it would be speculation to award prejudgment interest based on
the verdict that the jury returned. Appellees also noted that Donatelli had waived any
right to prejudgment interest because he failed to object to the verdict or the form while
the jury was still impaneled, thereby creating the condition of which he now complains.
Donatelli filed a Reply Memorandum. Judge Roth issued his Memorandum Decision and
Order without oral argument, attached herein as Addendum #2.
4

Disposition. The trial court denied Donatelli's application for prejudgment
interest in the Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 30 , 2007, on the basis that
the jury verdict did not ask the jury to distinguish between special (economic) and
general (non-economic) damages; that the Plaintiff had agreed to this aspect that it is the
province of the jury and the jury alone to assess damages; and that the time for
correcting such a situation is before the jury is released.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
When the defense rested in the trial of this matter in April, 2007, the jury was
presented with instructions regarding economic and non-economic damages. R. 18111813 and R. 2507, 89:2-5, 23-25 and 90:1-91:4. The parties participated in drafting the
jury instructions and Plaintiffs prepared the jury verdict form, both of which were
discussed with Judge Roth prior to submission to the jury. R. 1766 - 1818. After the jury
was sent out three times, it awarded Donatelli $137, 543.48. R. 1767. The jury entered
the award on the Interrogatories to Jury and Jury Verdict in response to question number
7. Id. The Interrogatories and Jury Verdict contains no other questions to enable the jury
to separate the award into economic and non-economic damages. R. 1766-68.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Donatelli created the situation of which he complains. The jury received a special
verdict form, which Donatelli's counsel had drafted, submitted, requested and argued for.
The jury instructions and the special verdict form were reviewed in chambers, argued
about, and finalized before counsel gave their closing arguments. Donatelli's counsel,
Terry Mackey, referred to the special verdict form in his closing argument. There is no
5

way, other speculation, to distinguish how much of the award the jury intended for
economic damages and how much of the award was intended for non-economic damages.
This is especially true given the final composition of the six jurors that agreed on the
verdict. One final juror had opposed the amount of the proposed award in the polling
about the two unacceptable versions of the verdict. Donatelli created the condition of
which he now complains in that he failed to object or correct the verdict form, or ask for
clarification of the damage award at the time the jury was seated. As a result, Donatelli
has waived any entitlement to prejudgment interest and the trial court's decision should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

DONATELLI
INTEREST.
A.

WAIVED

HIS

ENTITLEMENT

Donatelli Has Not Proved
Mathematical Certainty.

His

Past

TO

Medical

PREJUDMENT

Expenses

with

Donatelli argues that he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire amount
awarded by the jury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. This statute provides that
the plaintiff may receive interest on the special damages "actually incurred that are
assessed by the verdict of the jury." In this case the special verdict did not assess any
amount as special or economic damages.
Appellees do not dispute that generally an award of special damages may be
entitled to prejudgment interest under Utah Code. Ann. § 78-27-44. Appellees offered
evidence at the trial that not all of Donatelli's claimed expenses were a result of the
injuries caused by the accident. In this case, the special verdict form does not make any
6

distinction as to whether the award, or how much of the award, may be considered
special and/or general damages. Therefore, the special damages, on which prejudgment
interest is awarded, cannot be specifically determined "within a mathematical certainty."
B.

The Trial Court Should Not Speculate As To The Jury's Intentions.

Donatelli argues that the jury clearly expressed its intentions to award past medical
specials by writing on the verdict form the exact amount of the medical expenses
submitted in evidence. To arrive at this conclusion, one must engage in speculation as to
the jury's intention rather than dealing with the facts as applied to Utah case law.
First, jury instructions were given regarding the award of both economic and noneconomic damages. R. 1811-1813 and R. 2507, 89:2-5, 23-25 and 90:1-91:4. Plaintiffs
participated in drafting the jury instructions and prepared the jury verdict form, which
were submitted to the jury. R. 1766 - 1818. Paragraph 7 of the Interrogatories to Jury
and Jury Verdict contains only one question pertaining to the award of damages to
Donatelli:
What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano
Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision, as
addressed in these instructions?
$

R. 1767 (hereinafter "Paragraph 7"). Clearly, there is no distinction as to whether that
award is based on special or general damages and Donatelli did not provide the jury an
opportunity to make that distinction in their award.
Second, at no time did Donatelli object to the form of Paragraph 7 or to the award
as not distinguishing between special and general damages while the jury was seated,
7

even though he had ample opportunity to do so. "It is the rule in Utah that a failure to
object to a verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged
constitutes a waiver of the objection." Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, Tf 18, 138
P.3d 75 (quoting Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980)
(quotations and citations omitted)). When special interrogatories or verdicts of the jury
are ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to filing of verdict or to move
that they be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson
Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, requiring
an objection while the jury is still seated serves the objective of avoiding the expense and
additional time for a new trial by having the jury, which heard the facts, clarify the
ambiguity while it is able to do so. Id. Donatelli waived any objection to the lump sum
verdict by not objecting while the jury was still seated.
Donatelli is solely responsible for creating the condition of which he now
complains. Paragraph 7 was specifically discussed with the district court during a final
review of the jury instructions and verdict form. R. 2507, 44:8 - 45:11. Counsel for
Donatelli even specifically approved Paragraph 7 during this final review (R. 2507,
44:13-14) and wrote and approved the entire verdict form. Plaintiffs never objected or
sought to amend the verdict form during the time the jury was seated, even though the
jury was sent out three separate times for deliberations. As Judge Roth succinctly stated
in his memorandum Decision and Order: "It seems the party who invited that award
should bear the burden associated with it." Memorandum Decision and Order, p.3.
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The record reflects that the jury returned two unacceptable verdicts before their
final acceptable verdict. R. 2507, 142:3-143:1; 147:1-168:12; and 168:16-171:25. Each
time, the same verdict form was used. The parties had their attention called to the
damages line on each return of the jury yet counsel for Donatelli never asked for a
correction. The time to correct the verdict was before the jury was dismissed and Judge
Roth even specifically asked if there was anything more to be done before the jury was
released. R. 2507, 171:13-15.
Plaintiffs' counsel argues that it is obvious that the award was the amount of the
medical expenses and that therefore we can "know" what the jury was thinking. This
argument breaks down upon review of the jurors' statements about their decision-making
process when they came back into the courtroom and were on the record.
When the jury first returned, the special verdict form said "$137,543.48 and their
attorneys' fees." Six of the jurors were for that verdict and two were against. They (the
two against) made statements that seemed to indicate that the proposed verdict was too
large. Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask that a line for special damages be added to the
special verdict form. Judge Roth told the jury that it could not add attorneys' fees in that
way and sent the jury back for further deliberations. R. 142:3 - 143:1.
When the jury returned the second time, the special verdict form said
"$137,543.48" with no reference to attorneys' fees. When the jury was polled as to their
verdict they turned out to be 5-2 and 1. Five of the previously agreeing six jurors stood
by the returned verdict; two remained opposed and one juror that had been with the five
in the jury room said that she had changed her mind between the jury room and the jury
9

box in the courtroom.

She said that she still believed that the Plaintiffs should be

awarded attorneys fees. Even at this point, Plaintiffs' counsel once again failed to request
a change in the special verdict form. Judge Roth sent the jury back to continue their
deliberations with instructions that six of the eight had to agree. R. 147:1-168:12.
When the jury retuned for the third time, the special verdict form still said
"$137,543.48"; but there was a change in the jury alignment. The five were still for the
stated amount; and the single juror that had changed her mind between the jury room and
the courtroom stood by her position that the verdict was not enough; but one of the two
jurors that had been opposed to the $137,543.48 changed her vote to favor the completed
agreed upon amount. (So the jury was now 1-6-1.) R. 168:16-171:25. Judge Roth had
six jurors that said in open court that they agreed with the verdict. He then asked if there
was anything further. No one asked for a change to the special verdict form and Judge
Roth dismissed the jury. R. 2507, 171:13-15.
Donatelli's counsel had every opportunity to correct the verdict form while the
jury was seated but failed to do so. The time for the clarification of damages is before the
jury is released. The trial court reasoned that because it was not clear how much of the
verdict was intended to compensate Donatelli for his special damages, it would be
speculation by the trial court to conclude that Donatelli is entitled to prejudgment interest.
Defendants' position, and the trial court's decision, is best described by the following
quote:
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The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been
returned is for the trial court to require the jury to return for further
deliberation. It is well established by numerous authorities that, when a
verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it,
any error in said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the
time of its rendition failed to make any request that its informality or
uncertainty be corrected.
Langdon v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971). R. 2198. In other
words, as Judge Roth succinctly stated: "Where the error in failing to identify whether the
damages are special or general was invited by an inadequate verdict form, it seems the
party who invited that award should bear the burden associated with it." R. 2198.
While it is difficult to understand why Donatelli's counsel did not speak up when
she had the opportunity to do so, the Langton court sums up a similar situation:
The silence of plaintiffs counsel, upon hearing the verdict, is
comprehensible, he could reasonably have concluded that the jury was
unsympathetic to his course or parsimonious, and he would, of course,
prefer a new jury. There must be reasonable rules to control the
termination of litigation, if counsel has an opportunity to correct error at
the time of its occurrence and he fails to do so, any objection based
thereupon is waived.
Id. at 47. Donatelli failed to identify any irregularity in the verdict form even though he
had ample opportunity to do so. He is not entitled to prejudgment interest because the
amount of special damages cannot be determined with mathematical certainty.
II.

THE VERDICT MUST INCLUDE BOTH SPECIAL AND GENERAL
DAMAGES TO BE VALID,
As a general rule, it is improper for a jury to award special damages without

awarding any general damages. Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, ^f 16, 138 P.3d 75.
Even if it were apparent that the jury intended that Plaintiff receive only his special
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damages, it is clear from the case law that the verdict would not be valid, as special
damages are not allowed unless general damages have been found. Id. The jury was
clearly instructed, as shown above, regarding both economic and non-economic damages
so it must be presumed that the jury took both into consideration when awarding damages
to Donatelli. Unfortunately, Donatelli failed to note a separate line on the verdict form so
the jury had no choice but to lump both together. There is no way of knowing what the
jury intended. Either the lump sum includes both economic and non-economic damages
which cannot be determined and therefore Donatelli is denied prejudgment interest, or the
judgment, which Appellees already paid, is invalid. It would be speculation to conclude
that Donatelli is entitled to prejudgment interest on the whole award or any portion
thereof.
CONCLUSION
Appellees believe that the trial court ruled correctly in their favor. Plaintiffs failed
to correct their own verdict form and waived any further right to correct it once the jury
was dismissed. Donatelli must now bear the burden of that own error because it is not
within the province of any court to speculate as to what the jury intended when it
awarded the damage amount. Moreover, even if the jury intended that amount of the
award to be only special damages, without an award of general damages, the verdict must
be invalid. Without an amount specifically designated as special damages, prejudgment
interest is simply not available.

12

Dated this 14th day of July, 2008.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

Tim Dalton Dunn
Kathleen M. Liuzzi
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees by U.S. mail,
first-class, postage pre-paid, on July 14, 2008, to counsel of record as follows:
Edward P. Moriarity
Bradley L. Booke
Jacque M. Ramos
Terry Mackey
Moriarity, Badaruddin & Booke
8 East Broadway, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

b^&stl/rtsM
Legal Secretary
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ADDENDUM #1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

GAETANO A. DONATELLI, LAURA
DONATELLI

INTERROGATORIES TO JURY
AND JURY VERDICT

Plaintiffs),
vs.
TROY BEAUMONT and PENHALL
COMPANY,
Defendant(s).

Civil No. 050102304
Judge: Stephen L. Roth

We, the duly-impaneled jury in the above-captioned matter, answer the following
questions:

1. Was the defendant Troy Beaumont negligent?

Yes_

/

No

2. Was the negligence of Troy Beaumont a proximate cause of any
injury(ies) to Gaetano Donatelli?

Yes

/

No

FILE©
THIRD DISTRICT COURl

APR\p 2007
WESTJORDAKDEPl
0017G6

3. Was the defendant Troy Beaumont acting within the course and scope of
his employment at the time of the collision?

Yes

'

No

4. Was plaintiff Gaetano Donatelli negligent?

Yes

No

y

5. Was the negligence of Gaetano Donatelli a proximate cause of his
injury(ies)?

Yes

No S
6. What percentage of the "fault" (as defined in the instructions given to you
by the court) is attributable to defendant Troy Beaumont and what
percentage is attributable to Plaintiff, Gaetano Donatelli (the percentages
of fault must total 100%)?
Troy Beaumont
Gaetano Donatelli
Total fault

100%

7. What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano
Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision, as
addressed in these instructions?

$ /37f.^4Z^

4?

-h—h^t,

LI^UA-L-

Kfcfe'g

^^-7-^T

8.

If you find for Gaetano Donatelli, what amount of money will fairly and
reasonably compensate Laura Donatelli, as a result of the collision, for her
loss of consortium, as addressed in these instructions?

$

-0~

Dated this

£1

day of

N/WUU,

2007.

Jury Foreperson

001768

ADDENDUM #2

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

GAETANO A. DONATELLI and LAURA
DONATELLI,
Plaintiff
vs.

:
:
:

PENHALL COMPANY, a California
Corporation, and TROY BEAUMONT,
Individually,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

CaseNo.:050102304

Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH

Defendant

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion and Application for Prejudgment Interest
and Entry of Judgment. Having considered the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court enters the
following decision:
This matter was tried before a jury April 25-April 27, 2007. In addition to other damages
evidence, the Plaintiffs provided the jury with evidence of $137,543.48 in medical expenses. Finding
Defendant Beaumont ("Defendant") 100% liable for Gaetano Donatelli's injuries, the jury returned an
award for Plaintiffs for exactly $137,543.48. The jury did not award Gaetano's wife, Laura any award
for loss of consortium. Following questions as to whether both parties were negligent, the
Interrogatories to Juiy and Jury Verdict simply asks "What amount of money will fairly and reasonably
compensate Gaetano Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision as addressed

002136

DONATELLI v. BEAUMONT

Page 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

jury and conclude that 100 per cent of the damages assessed are economic damages for which the prejudgment interest rule applies, there are two reasons to resist the urge to do so.
First, where a jury has been requested, and trial by jury has been conducted, it is the province
of the jury, and of the jury alone to assess damages. While there is room in the rules of procedure for
a timely clarification as to the type of damages the jury intended to award, the time for receiving that
clarification is before the jury is released. InLangton v. International Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452,
491 P.2d 1211, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been
returned is for the trial court to require the jury to return for further
deliberation. It is well established by numerous authorities that, when a
verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it,
any error in said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the
time of its rendition failed to make any request that its informality or
uncertainty be corrected.
Id. at 456 (quoting Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063,1065-1066, citations and alterations
omitted). In this case, where the error in failing to identify whether the damages are special or general
was invited by an inadequate verdict form, it seems the party who invited that award should bear the
burden associated with it.
Second, even if it were apparent that the jury intended that Plaintiff receive his economic
damages, and only his economic damages, it is clear from the case law that in fact, the verdict would
not be valid, as special damages are not allowed unless general damages have been found. See id. The
claim, therefore, that the award is entirely for special damages cannot be affirmed. Because the Court
cannot agree with the Plaintiff that pre-judgment interest should be awarded on the entire amount, and
it is not clear how much of the verdict was intended to compensate Plaintiff for his special damages, it

c-cmos

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
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